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Global harmonization through public-private partnership: The 
case of pharmaceuticals 
Stéphanie Dagron1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The harmonization activities of the International Conference on 
Harmonization (ICH) in the field of pharmaceutical marketing regulation 
perfectly illustrate the possible normative influence of non-binding instruments adopted 
by sub-national actors. The ICH is a hybrid organization composed of representatives of 
the pharmaceutical industry on one hand and the national regulation agencies of three 
regions on the other. An intergovernmental organization, the World Health Organization 
(WHO), is associated to the ICH activities through its observer status. The ICH has 
adopted more than 50 “technical” guidelines which have developed into global 
standards. It has thus become extremely difficult for national regulators to modify the 
criteria for drug marketing approval unilaterally. Some guidelines go beyond the 
standardization of technical requirements. They reflect commercial, political or ethical 
choices and pose complex legitimacy and accountability challenges. The analysis of the 
multi-level procedure and institutional framework of the ICH has so far not been 
conducted from a global administrative law perspective. A closer examination of the ICH 
process reveals a deficient structure and the need for the development of new legal 
standards. Some steps already taken by the ICH should be pursued further and could 
contribute a model for greater accountability and legitimacy for new forms of global 
administrative decision-making procedures. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent catastrophe in France concerning the prescription of the diabetes drug 
Mediator, also used as an appetite suppressant, has gripped the attention of the public, 
catalyzed public opinion and caused political reactions. Mediator was banned from the 
French market in 2009. In autumn 2010, the French drug agency responsible for the 
safety of health products1 revealed that over the last 30 years, approximately 500 to 
2000 patients in France who took Mediator have died because of the drug’s side-effects2. 
The direct reaction of the French health political authorities was to announce the 
strengthening of medicine regulations and more precisely the strengthening of the 
approval criteria for safety, efficacy and quality retained by the competent regulatory 
agency. But is the decision to reinforce these criteria nowadays still really in the hands of 
the French or other national (or supranational) authorities?  
Safety, efficacy and quality criteria for the assessment of medicines are accepted 
worldwide as universal criteria conditioning the marketing authorization of drugs. This 
has been the case since the second half of the 20th century3. Until then, the majority of 
drugs on the world market had - at best - been subject to a notification requirement to 
the responsible agency and had never been tested for pharmacological quality, safety 
and efficacy4. It is only after the Second World War that the whole regulatory system was 
reshaped globally as a reaction to various unfortunate events across the world.5 The 
Thalidomide disaster of 1959-1961, which had worldwide consequences,6 serves as 
example. It caused the reshaping of the entire regulatory system globally, to protect 
consumers7 in the pharmaceutical industry.  
                                                          
1 The AFSSAPS is the French agency for the security of therapeutic goods, i.e. drugs and 
therapeutic devices. 
2 See Le Monde 16. Nov. 2010. Many public reports have been published about the Mediator. See 
at least the first one: A.-C. Bensadon, E. Marie, A. Morelle, Enquête sur le Mediator®, Inspection générale 
des affaires sociales, January 2011 
(http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/114000028/0000.pdf). 
3 In Europe these criteria have first been introduced by the Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 
1965 concerning medicinal products. The directive required an authorization for the marketing of 
medicinal products (art. 3), the criteria for the marketing being (and still continue to be): proven 
therapeutic effect, safety in normal use and pharmaceutical quality (art. 5).  
4 See for example the French Statute of the 11th September 1941 which prescribes a visa 
confirming that a new product has been declared. For an analysis of the French legislation see S. 
Chauveau, Genèse de la «sécurité sanitaire»: les produits pharmaceutiques en France aux XIXème et 
XXème siècles, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 51 (2004), at 89. 
5 About the decisive events in France and the USA see: C. Bonah, J.-P. Gaudillière, Faute, 
accident ou risque iatrogène? La régulation des événements indésirables du médicament à l’aune des 
affaires Stalinon et Distilbène, Revue Française des Affaires Sociales (2007), at 123.  
6 Except for France and the USA, patients in almost every developed country have been victims of 
adverse reactions to the substance Thalidomide. On this event see: B. Kirk, Der Contergan-Fall: eine 
unvermeidbare Arzneimittelkatastrophe?, 1999.  
7 The first worldwide attempt to require drugs to be tested for safety and labeled for use has been 
made in the USA with the 1938 Food Drugs and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The mechanism was incomplete. 
The Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FDCA have been adopted in 1962. Following these 
amendments, all new drugs have to be approved by the FDA before they can be imported, manufactured, 
distributed or sold in the USA.   
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Not surprisingly, drug approval requirements vary from one country to another, 
mostly as a consequence of differences in the risk-benefit assessments undertaken by the 
different regulatory agencies as well as differences in the national political or industrial 
choices. The separate national registration procedures have long presented an important 
obstacle to the worldwide marketing of drugs. To obtain the authorization to market 
their products, the pharmaceutical companies have to apply for products approval in 
each country. These procedures entail substantial costs, both for the governments 
responsible for their approval and for the industry connected to the variable testing 
requirements mandated to evaluate the safety, efficacy and quality of a product (for 
example through the obligation to conduct national clinical trials). These procedures also 
cause delays in the delivering of new drugs or unavailability of some drugs in some 
markets. 
Efforts to harmonize marketing mechanisms were first made within the European 
community8. These efforts succeeded after four decades of discussion and partial 
harmonization regulation, through the establishment of the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products (today called the European Medicines Agency, EMA) 
and the progressive emergence of a single market for pharmaceuticals at least for new 
“innovative” pharmaceuticals9. This drug category is the most important for the 
industry: new innovative drugs are usually sold on prescription and covered by patents. 
In other words, these drugs should permit the industry to regain the financial 
investments made for the research and development of the drug; whereas the two other 
categories, which are the generic or multi-source drugs and the “Over-the-counter” 
drugs (OTC medicines) are not of interest in this respect10. 
On the global level, efforts towards harmonization have not yet lead to a central 
marketing procedure. The most successful enterprise concerns the harmonization of the 
technical requirements for the registration of drugs11. This harmonization is a result of 
the work of the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements 
for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) created in 1990. The ICH 
                                                          
8 On the initial harmonization efforts in Europe and the drug authorization mechanisms see: D. 
Vogel, The globalization of pharmaceutical regulation, Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 11 
(1998), at 1-22 (5). 
9 On the progressive development of European law in the field of drug regulation, see J. Feick, 
Regulatory Europeanization, National Autonomy and regulatory Effectiveness: Marketing Authorization 
for Pharmaceuticals, MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/6. On more recent developments: W.-H. Roth, 
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines einheitlichen Binnenmarktes für Arzneimittel, Europarecht, Beiheft 2, 
2007, at. 9.  
10 Generics are drug products comparable to reference listed drug products that are not protected 
anymore by a patent. Their price is supposed to be low. OTC medicines are non-prescription medicines 
that were previously (before reclassification) available only on prescription.  
11 On the contrary, the standards for intellectual property protection, including (drug) patent, have 
been to a large extent harmonized at the global level through the adoption in 1994 by the members of the 
World Trade Organization of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Although there is a strong connection between intellectual property rights and the approval 
regulatory scheme, the analysis of these standards would exceed the scope of this article. On the conflict 
between patent law obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicine, see H. Hestermeyer, 
Human Rights and the WTO, The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines, 2007. 
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is a public-private partnership12, bringing together an intergovernmental organization 
(the WHO), national regulatory authorities and industry associations from three regions 
in the world: Europe, USA and Japan. It was created with the fundamental objectives to 
use resources more efficiently, save substantial time and costs involved in the 
development and investigation of new drugs and thus serve the interests of the consumer 
and promote public health13. In the ICH, the major association of each nation's 
(research-based) pharmaceutical industry14 is accepted as a party on equal footing with 
the regulatory agencies15 of the three participating regions. In addition, the International 
Federation of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) is the 
secretariat. The industry’s influence could not be more obvious.  
This active participation of the drug industry in the development of standards 
applicable to marketing authorization, but also to post-marketing control 
(pharmacovigilance) has been criticized by many authors16 and non-governmental 
associations17. Their critiques are mostly directed at the contradictory motivation of the 
pharmaceutical industry, which has a cost-recovery interest in the development of new 
drugs and hence would support early marketing of its drugs, and the failure of the 
harmonization process to be in favor of public health rather than for private profit. 
These critiques of the legitimacy of the governance activities of the ICH focus on the 
particular position of one stakeholder – the pharmaceutical industry – in relation to 
                                                          
12 On the definition and proliferation of public-private partnerships in the global health landscape 
since the latter half of the 1990s, see: K. Buse, G. Walt, Global public-private partnerships: Part. I- a new 
development in health?, Bull World Health Orga, vol. 78 (2000), at 549; G. L. Burci, Public-private 
partnerships in the public health sector, International Organizations Law Review, 6 (2009), at. 359.   
13 See the ICH “Terms of reference”, 1990. Unless noted otherwise, all information and 
documentation on the ICH is to be found on ICH’s website: www.ich.org. 
14 The research-based industry is to be distinguished from the generic industry. In the first case, the 
pharmaceutical companies invest a part of their budget in discovering and developing new medicines 
(Research and Development laboratories, R&D). Generic pharmaceutical companies bring drugs to the 
market after patent expiration as less expensive version. Pharmaceutical (research-based) companies are 
represented within the ICH through the umbrella organizations EFPIA (Europe), JPMA (Japan) and 
PhRMA (USA). 
15 Regulatory officials come from the United States (FDA), the European Union (Committee for the 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CHMP) within the EMA) and Japan (Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare).  
16 See the following articles: J. Abraham, T. Reed, Trading Risks for Markets: the International 
Harmonization of Pharmaceuticals Regulation, Health, Risk and Society 2001, at 113; J. Abraham, The 
Pharmaceutical Industry as a Political Player, The Lancet 360 (2002), at 1498; J. Abraham, C. Davis, 
Interpellative Sociology of Pharmaceuticals: Problems and Challenges for Innovation and Regulation in 
the 21st Century, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 19 (2007), at. 387. See also the 
“indirect” criticism from Burci, supra note 12, at. 373. Although not mentioning the ICH activities, the 
author notes more generally that the setting of normative standards is “more appropriately exercised by 
WHO in view of its constitutional mandate as well as of the political legitimacy, accountability and 
technical authority conferred by its intergovernmental structure […]”. 
17 See for example the critiques by Health Action International Europe (HAI) formulated 1996 in 
the Uppsala Declaration: Statement of the international working group on transparency and 
accountability in drug regulation, at point 9 (http://www.isdbweb.org/pages/35). See also the critics of the 
Revue Prescrire: ICH: an Exclusive Club of Drug Regulatory Agencies and Drug Companies Imposing its 
Rules on the Rest of the World, Prescrire International, August 2010, at. 183.  
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others such as regulatory authorities, patients, or non-governmental organizations. On 
the other hand however, many authors applaud the success of the ICH harmonization 
process arguing that in this field expertise is needed to contribute to the development of 
common rules. These authors specifically underline the positive influence of the 
harmonization process which has rendered “national government regulation more 
efficient and effective”18 thus assuming that efficiency produces legitimacy.  
A more differentiated approach is needed. In this paper I propose to follow the 
agenda set by the Global Administrative Law (GAL) literature19 for the analysis of the 
exercise of public authority by global administrative agencies20. This agenda relies on the 
use of legal concepts (such as rules addressing competences, procedures, participation, 
transparency, accountability etc.) for the analysis of regulatory activities21 and offers 
another perspective for the analysis of the legitimacy of the ICH22. My purpose is not to 
enter the conceptual discussion concerning the existence of a set of legal rules and 
principles governing the activities of global administrative actors23. My approach is 
deliberately pragmatic: given the fact that the enforcement of standards developed by 
the ICH has proven very efficient, I propose to search for the forms and procedures that 
should be applied to this transnational decision-making process in order to make it 
accountable and legitimate24.  
The proponents of GAL have come to the conclusion that the legitimacy challenges 
                                                          
18 See Vogel, supra note 8, at 20. Concerning the clarification in the field of pediatric research 
through the ICH guidelines, see A. E. Ryan, Protecting the Rights of Pediatric Research Subjects in the 
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, Fordham Int’L.J. 23 (1999-2000), at 848. For the field of 
pharmacovigilance see the positive remarks in the following article: P. Bahri, P. Tsintis, 
Pharmacovigilance-related Topics at the Level of the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH), 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety 2005, at. 377 (383). 
19 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R. B. Stewart, J. Wiener, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005); S. Cassese, Administrative Law without the State? 
The Challenge of Global Regulation, Journal of International Law and Politics, 37 (2005); A. von 
Bogdandy, P. Dann, M. Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a 
Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, German Law Journal 9 (2008). 
20 More specifically on the general legal issues involved by the growing activities of public-private 
bodies at the international level see: B. Kingsbury, L. Casini, Global administrative law dimensions of 
international organizations law, International Organizations Law Review, 6 (2009), at. 319 (345). On the 
necessity to address the challenges raised by hybrid actors intervening in the global health landscape with 
regard to administrative law type principles see: Burci, supra note 12, at 366. 
21 See M. Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the 
Exercise of International Public Authority, German Law Journal  9 (2008), at 1867. 
22 On the question of legitimacy of expert committees, see also the arguments of A. Peters, P. 
Bürkli, Recht der Forschung am Menschen – Normegenese im Kontext von soft law, internationalen 
Abkommen und Gesetz, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 129 (2010), more specifically at 387. 
23 For insights into that conceptual discussion see: K. H. Ladeur, The emergence of global 
administrative law and transnational regulation, Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 
2011/1; D. Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the concept of (global) administrative law, Institute for 
International Law and Justice Working paper 2008/7. 
24 The same pragmatic agenda is followed by L. Boisson de Chazournes in: Changing roles of 
international organizations: Global administrative law and the interplay of legitimacy, International 
Organizations Law Review, 6 (2009), at 655 (659). 
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posed by the multiple international instruments differed, depending on how 
authoritative the international institutions’ policies are. Accordingly, the legal standards 
to be developed for ensuring the legitimacy of each exercise of international public 
authority could not possibly be the same for all instruments25. These conclusions will 
guide my analysis: the nature of the authority exercised by the ICH guidelines will first 
be analyzed (I); an evaluation of the legitimacy of the ICH with regard to the authority 
of these activities and a proposition for considering new legal standards eventually better 
adapted to the public-private character of the ICH will follow (II). 
 
2. The global authority of the ICH-activities: normative influence on technical 
but also industrial, political and ethical choices 
 
The ICH has been established to support harmonization of the technical approval 
requirements in the three participating regions. For this purpose, it has published more 
than 50 guidelines pertaining to quality, efficacy and safety. It also made 
recommendations and created instruments for the so-called multidisciplinary areas26. 
The authority of the activities of the ICH has to be measured with regard to the binding 
character of the guidelines (1) and their real content (2). 
a. The normative authority of the guidelines 
The first focus of the ICH was the harmonization of the technical approval requirements 
in the three participating regions (Europe, Japan and the USA) through the development 
of non-binding instruments27. The success of this process is confirmed by the fact that 
these instruments have developed into global standards, thus receiving more attention 
than the standards developed for the same areas by the World Health Organization28, 
the World Medical Association (WMA)29 or the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS)30. The guidelines and instruments adopted by the ICH 
exercise a normative influence in many countries within (1.1) but also outside the group 
of the ICH participating regions (1.2).  
                                                          
25 See Goldmann, supra note 21, at 1868. The same argument has been developed in the German 
constitutional case law and literature concerning the legitimacy of certain kind of administrative 
authorities as for instance expert committees. On this point see: S. Dagron, La théorie allemande de la 
légitimité démocratique de l’administration, Revue européenne de droit public 18 (2006) 4, at 1279. 
26 The Medical Terminology Dictionary (MedDRA), the Common Marketing Application Form for 
New Pharmaceutical Products (Common Technical Document, CTD) and the Electronic Standards for 
the Transfer of Regulatory Information and Data (ESTRI) belong to this section.  
27 Statement by the ICH Steering Committee, Tokyo, 1990. 
28 See for example the GCP guidelines of WHO which are considered as being informative tools for 
less experienced users.  
29 Only a few standards applicable to drug regulation have been developed by the WMA. See the 
ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects in the Declaration of Helsinki. 
30 The CIOMS has been established jointly by WHO and UNESCO in 1949. Drug safety topics 
have been covered by CIOMS and developed into “consensus guidelines”. CIOMS Reports concerning the 
international reporting of adverse drug reactions have been largely used by ICH for the formulation of the 
Pharmacovigilance-related guidelines. On this influence see P. Bahri et al., supra note 18, at. 380. 
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I. The normative authority of the ICH guidelines in the ICH regions 
The normative influence of the ICH guidelines and instruments is manifest in all ICH 
participant regions. The regulatory authorities of the USA, Europe and Japan have 
committed themselves to making use of the guidelines and instruments developed and 
adopted by the ICH. The implementation in the national system is carried out according 
to the national or regional procedures that apply in the three regions31.  
ICH guidelines are not de jure binding in the ICH regions. However, they have a 
significant de facto binding force that cannot be ignored. According to the document 
concerning the procedure for European Union guidelines first adopted in 2005 by the 
EMA, “once adopted by the CHMP, ICH guidelines have the same status as other 
European scientific guidelines and replace existing guidelines on the subject covered” (§ 
4.1.3). This status is specified in § 2.2 as follows: scientific guidelines “are ‘soft law’”; 
they have a “quasi-binding character that can derive from the legal basis when the 
guideline intends to specify how to fulfill a legal obligation”. This “quasi-binding” 
character has been confirmed by national courts that refer to the ICH guidelines (as 
adopted by the CHMP) as evidence of the state-of-the-art of pharmaceutical research 
and development32. In the practice, applicants have no other choice than to follow and 
respect the ICH guidelines. This obligation is strictly framed through the so-called 
Common Technical Document (CTD) that has been adopted in the three participating 
regions33. The CTD is a common (electronic) marketing application form for new 
pharmaceutical products. It combines all ICH guidelines and provides detailed 
instructions for the registration dossier to accompany an application for a new product34. 
If applicants wish not to follow the guidelines, they have to provide reasons and 
justifications for deviation from the dispositions.  
The strong and multi-leveled impact of the guidelines is illustrated perfectly in the 
                                                          
31 In the European Union for instance, the ICH guidelines are adopted by the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) which is the scientific committee of the EMA and 
incorporated into the list of scientific guidelines that has to be adhered to by applicants. See the document 
concerning the procedure for European Union guidelines adopted by the EMA (§ 4.1.3): 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/10/WC500004011.p
df. On the implementation mechanism in the USA see J. G. Contrera, The FDA and ICH: How 
harmonious will international pharmaceutical regulations become? Admin. L. J. Am. U. 927 (1994-1995), 
928 (946). See also the Comprehensive list (2010) containing all ICH guidelines at: 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/default.htm. 
32 See for example the decision 2009 by the German Administrative Court of North Rhine-
Westphalia cited by K. Engelke, Transnationalisierung der Arzneimittelregulierung, MedR Schriftenreihe 
Medizinrecht (2010), 619 (623). 
33 ICH M 4. The CTD is always described as the key instrument of the ICH. See for example: S. K. 
Branch, Guidelines from the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH), Journal of pharmaceutical 
and Biomedical Analysis 38 (2005), 798; J. J. Lee, What is Past is Prologue: the ICH and Lessons learned 
from European Drug Regulation Harmonization, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 
26 (2005), 151. 
34 An application conformed to the CTD format has 5 parts called module. The first module is not 
part of the CTD and authorizes individualization, each region being able to require additional information. 
Module 2 contains summaries on quality requirements, and non-clinical and clinical information. Module 
3 is dedicated to quality, module 4 to non-clinical study reports and module 5 to clinical study reports.  
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European Union, where all 27 member-states have to comply with the process initiated 
by ICH by virtue of their EU membership. This is a consequence of the directive 
2001/83/EC, according to which every application for marketing authorization within 
the European Union has to take into account the ICH guidelines35. Thus, compliance 
with the ICH standards is necessary not only within the scope of the centralized 
application procedure36 for which the European Commission is responsible, but also 
within the national procedures. The centralized procedure was established in 1993 and 
allows applicants to obtain a marketing authorization that is valid throughout the EU. 
However, this procedure is only compulsory for all human medicines derived from 
biotechnology and other high-tech processes as well as medicinal products containing 
new substances, intended for the treatment of certain diseases like cancer or diabetes37. 
It is optional for any other products containing new active substances not authorized in 
the Community before 2004, products which constitute a significant therapeutic, 
scientific or technical innovation or products for which a Community authorization is in 
the interest of the patients. For medicines that do not fall within these categories, the 
marketing authorization is accorded by the national regulatory authority under a 
national procedure for medicinal products to be marketed in one Member State only or 
for products to be marketed in the EU. In the latter case the so-called “mutual 
recognition” procedure38 and the “decentralized” procedure39 both presume the 
existence of a national marketing authorization awarded in terms of national rules. 
II. The normative authority of the guidelines beyond the ICH regions 
The ICH was not intended as a worldwide harmonization effort, but the impact of 
the guidelines has extended beyond the ICH regions. First, most of the guidance has 
been adopted by the regulatory agencies of the two observers to ICH with no voting 
rights which are the Swiss Agency for therapeutic products (Swissmedic) representing 
the European Free Trade Association and the Canadian Agency (Health Canada)40. In 
these countries, the ICH guidelines have become administrative documents with no legal 
but a de facto binding force41.  
                                                          
35 The directive 2001/83/EC (art. 6, 8 and Annex 1) imposes the CTD presentation for all types of 
marketing applications.  
36 Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93. The system was revised 2004 (Regulation (EC) 726/2004), 
whereby its central features were retained and strengthened. 
37 In 2002 this represented 36% of all new drug approvals since the introduction of the new 
centralized European drug approval system in 1995. See the analysis of G. Walsh, Pharmaceutical 
Biotechnology Products approved within the European Union, European Journal of Pharmaceutics and 
Biopharmaceutics 55 (2003), 3. 
38 This procedure is based on the principle of the mutual recognition by EU Member States of their 
respective national marketing authorization. See for the basic arrangements, directive 2001/83/EC.   
39 This procedure is based on recognition by national authorities in the EU of a first assessment 
performed by one of the member States. See Directive 2004/27/EC. 
40 See about the de facto binding force of the guidelines in Canada: J. Lexchin, Who’s Calling the 
Tune, Harmonization of Drug Regulation in Canada, 2011, Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives 
(www.policyalternatives.ca). 
41 See for example the Notice adopted by Health Canada concerning the application of the CTD 
and the endorsement of ICH guidance by Health Canada (http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
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Second, the growing interest outside the ICH participants’ regions and observer 
countries for ICH activities had to be acknowledged by the ICH Steering Committee 
(ICH-SC) which is the governing body of the ICH42. At the fourth ICH meeting in 
Brussels in 1997, the ICH members thus decided to add new objectives to the 
Conference and more specifically the objective “to facilitate the dissemination and 
communication of information on harmonized guidelines and their use such as to 
encourage the implementation of common standards”43. In this perspective the Global 
Cooperation Group (GCG) was created in 1999 as a subcommittee of the Steering 
committee. It is made up of representatives from each of the six parties and observers to 
ICH but also representatives from five Regional Harmonization Initiatives (RHIs), which 
are the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)44, the Gulf Central Committee for 
Drug Registration (GCC-DR)45, the Pan-American Network for Drug Regulatory 
Harmonization (PANDRH)46, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)47 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Pharmaceutical Product Working group 
(ASEAN-PPWG)48. These RHIs pursue the aim of promoting harmonization of drug 
regulation among their members49 and have agreed through their participation in the 
ICH “to promote a mutual understanding of regional harmonization initiatives in order 
to facilitate harmonization processes related to ICH guidelines regionally and globally”50.  
Finally, the growing interest for the ICH activities has been concretized in some 
Non-ICH countries through the implementation or intended implementation of ICH 
guidelines into the national approval system. The de facto binding character of ICH 
guidelines in these countries has been acknowledged so far by the decision of the steering 
committee in 2007 to invite the Drug Regulatory Authorities or Department of health of 
eight Non-ICH countries (so far)51 to participate directly in the ICH GCG. These 
countries respond to the following criteria defined by the ICH GCG: use or intended use 
of ICH guidelines and whether a country or region is a source of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, medicinal products or clinical data for the ICH regions52.  
b. The commercial, political and ethical environment of the “technical” 
guidelines 
The ICH has always claimed that the content of its guidelines is of scientific and 
                                                                                                                                                               
mps/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-ld/ich/multidisciplin/ctd_m4_notice-eng.php).   
42 For procedural and institutional details, see Part. II 
43 Statement by the ICH steering committee, Brussels, 1997.  
44 21 current members. 
45 7 current members. 
46 PANDRH is composed of all the American States which are members of the Pan-American 
Health Organization (36 current members including the USA). 
47 15 current member States. 
48 10 current members. 
49 See the GCG criteria for selection of the RHIs. 
50 Final GCG Meeting report, 11.16.04. 
51 Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, India, Russia, Singapore and Republic of Korea. 
52 See the document called: Criteria/Considerations for ICH Global Cooperation Group 
Membership. 
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technical nature53, thus arguing that “technical” harmonization in the field of 
pharmaceuticals is possible, since technical requirements can be distinguished from their 
social and political environment54. The real nature of the guidelines is of particular 
importance since political, social or ethical choices pose more complex legitimacy 
challenges than “simple” technical content, based on scientific assessment. A closer 
analysis of the activities of ICH shows that some guidelines go beyond the 
standardization of technical requirements. In fact, the standards developed to frame the 
evidence base for drug quality, safety and efficacy can reflect commercial (2.1), but also 
political or ethical choices (2.2).  
I. Technical harmonization versus commercial/industrial issues 
The guidelines adopted by the ICH are dedicated to be applied during the different 
phases of drug development that lead to approval. The 13 safety guidelines adopted so 
far apply in the preclinical (also called non-clinical) phase, where in vitro studies using 
human cell fractions but also animal investigations are conducted to identify compounds 
that are most likely to have biopharmaceutical and clinical properties in humans. Animal 
experiments provide clinically useful information, predict drug class liability with respect 
to safety and generate exposure-response relationships for efficacy and safety which can 
be extrapolated from animals to humans. In order to minimize the use of animal testing, 
the different guidelines in this section have determined which tests have to be conducted, 
designed and interpreted55. The 21 guidelines on pharmaceutical quality adopted so far 
address the different phases of development and manufacturing of new substances and 
products. The objective of this set of guidelines is to ensure that the substances or 
products are of good quality during the cycle of their “life time”. Standards concern how 
stability testing56 is to be done and which information has to be generated for submission 
in registration application or which light sources are to be used, e.g. for photostability 
testing.  
The technical nature of the guidelines developed for these phases of drugs 
development is obvious. However it should be clear that the requirements related to the 
process of registration of new chemical entities and products also reflect commercial 
interests. The scientific level of each guideline has been interpreted by WHO as very high 
and as reflecting state-of-the-art technology57. But a high scientific level can lead to 
advantages for pharmaceutical companies who have the necessary resources to achieve 
                                                          
53 See the statement of the steering committee at the first Conference in 1990. See also the 
statement by the ICH steering committee at the fourth International Conference in 1997 in Brussels. The 
harmonization of technical requirements remains in 2010 the key instrument. See the publication written 
by the drug regulatory authorities associated with the ICH steering committee, the Global Cooperation 
Group and the Regulators Forum to salute two decades of ICH’s work in harmonizing drug regulatory 
requirements (2010, www. ich.org).  
54 About this distinction as a basis for harmonization in Europe see E. Cadeau, le médicament en 
droit public, 2000.    
55 ICH S 1 (carcinogenicity studies), S 2 A & B (genotoxicity testing) and S 4 and S 8 (toxicity and 
immunotoxicity studies).  
56 See ICH Q 1 A to Q 1 E.  
57 See Report of WHO meeting, 2001, The impact of implementation of ICH guidelines in non-ICH 
countries, at 21 (http://apps.who.int/medecinedocs/pdf/h2993e/h2993e.pdf). 
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the requested standards. Smaller industries in developing countries, but also generic 
producers, might not be able to meet these standards. Thus ICH standards could be 
seen as non-tariff barriers to trade forbidden by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade58. According to K. Timmermans, “increasing the standards beyond the 
technological capacity of pharmaceutical companies in developing countries would 
effectively exclude their competitive, generic products from the international market”59. 
The production of generics but also of pharmaceutical starting material in developing 
countries is endangered. In fact, ICH guidelines have introduced a tightening of 
specifications for pharmaceutical starting materials which is not always justified by 
additional safety benefits60. Another source of prohibitive costs for smaller companies is 
the Good Manufacturing Practice Guide for active pharmaceutical ingredients adopted 
by ICH in 2000. The guide contains recommendations for the manufacturing of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients, i.e. all operations of receipts of materials, production, 
packaging, labeling, quality control, release, storage and distribution. For WHO, this 
guideline “creates increased rigidity in the starting material supply system, with 
consequent effects on starting material prices and availability”61.  
II. Technical harmonization versus political or ethical choices  
Efficacy guidelines are – for the most part62 – concerned with the design, conduct, safety 
and reporting of clinical trials, which take place in the phases I, II and III of drug 
development. Phase I encompasses early human pharmacology studies, usually carried 
out in healthy volunteers or patients, who are not intended to be the end-users of the 
particular drug. The first studies in patients are conducted in phase II and aim to assess 
and confirm the therapeutic concept, explore the dosage safety and regimens as well as 
lack of acute safety issues in patients. These studies are conducted in small numbers of 
patients and precede the confirmatory phase (III) where studies are conducted in a 
larger number of patients. More complete information on clinical safety and efficacy, on 
adverse reaction and dosing are expected. Harmonization in the field of clinical studies 
may address technical and scientific issues; but some of these guidelines are also based 
on political and ethical choices.   
The first example is given by the guideline that relates to the extent of population 
exposure to assess clinical safety for drugs intended for long-term treatment of non-life 
threatening conditions63. The objective of the guideline was to harmonize the position of 
                                                          
58 The Agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT) has been adopted in 1995. It aims to ensure 
that technical regulations and standards do not “create unnecessary obstacles to international trade” 
(preamble, art. 2.2). Generally on the TBT Agreement see: R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, A. Seibert-Fohr (ed.), 
WTO-Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 2007. 
59 K. Timmermans, Harmonization, Regulation, and Trade: Interactions in the Pharmaceutuical 
Field, International Journal of Health Services, 34 (2004), at 651 (656). Same interpretation for M. H. 
Eliason, Regulatory Marketing Approval for Pharmaceuticals as a non-Tariff Barrier to Trade: Analysis 
under the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, San Diego International Law Journal 2007, 
at 559 (574). 
60 On this point see the critics in: WHO Report 2001, supra, note 57. 
61 Report ibid., at 22. 
62 Phase IV concerns the post-approval phase (so-called pharmacovigilance phase).  
63 ICH E 1. 
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the three regions on the issue of how much testing is required before a conclusion can be 
reached that a drug is safe for long-term treatment. Although scientific data reveals that 
some adverse events might only occur after drug treatment for more than six months, 
the guideline recommends that a clinical trial should include 300 to 600 patients for a 
period of six months64. With this solution, ICH makes a political choice: in reducing the 
level of scientific information on the security of the drug before drug approval, it gives 
national authorities an incentive to employ post-marketing regulation more effectively, 
so that it can rapidly withdraw a drug from the market after a major adverse reaction 
has been identified65.  
Another example is given by the guideline for Good Clinical Practice approved by 
the ICH steering Committee and recommended for adoption in May 199666. According 
to this guideline, non-therapeutic trials, i.e. studies where there is no direct clinical 
benefit to the subject67, may be conducted in subjects who are incapable of giving 
personal consent (e.g. in the case of children or adults who are unconscious or suffering 
from severe mental illness or disability). This possibility is extremely limited since it is 
conditioned by the delivery of the consent of a legally acceptable representative, 
provided some conditions like “low” foreseeable risks to the subjects and “minimized 
and low” burden on the subject’s well-being are respected. It is also conditioned by the 
recommendation that such trials “should” be conducted in patients having a disease or 
condition for which the investigational product is intended68. Nevertheless, the 
formulations adopted by ICH concerning the participation of vulnerable persons in trials 
are more flexible than the ones retained by international guidelines in this field69. First, 
the relation between principle and exception retained by the Helsinki Declaration or by 
the Oviedo Convention on human rights and biomedicine is not respected in the ICH 
guideline. In § 27 of the Helsinki Declaration the principle that incompetent subjects 
must not be included in non-therapeutic studies is stated before the conditions for 
exceptions. The Oviedo Convention is even clearer. It states in its article 6 the principle 
that “an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the 
capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit”. The conditions for the exceptional 
inclusion of non-competent persons in a non-therapeutic study are stressed in a separate 
article70. More importantly, a distinction has to be made between “low” foreseeable risks 
and “minimized and low” burden as foreseen in the ICH guideline on one hand, and the 
                                                          
64 § 4 of the guideline. 
65 On this example, see Abraham (2007), supra note 16, at 49. 
66 ICH E 6. 
67 That is the case for Phase I studies in healthy persons as described above or clinical studies 
conducted for the development of generic drugs, where a proof for the therapeutic equivalence and 
interchangeability of the generic product with a reference product is needed for marketing authorization.  
68 ICH E 6, at § 4. 8. 14.  
69 It is to be noted that different responses to the problem of non-therapeutic studies with subject 
incapable of giving personal consent exist. The Nuremberg Code on one hand forbids studies with non-
consenting subject. The Helsinki Declaration on the other hand sets (broad) conditions for the conduct of 
such studies. On the different rules see: L. M. Kopelman, What Conditions justify Risky Nontherapeutic or 
“No Benefit” Pediatric Studies: a sliding Scale Analysis, International and Comparative Health Law and 
Ethics, 2004 at. 749. 
70 Art. 17, Oviedo Convention.  
 16 
 
“minimal risk and minimal burden” required by the above cited texts on the other hand. 
According to the interpretation of “minimal risk” given by the Additional Protocol to the 
Oviedo Convention, the “research bears a minimal risk if […] it is to be expected that it 
will result, at the most, in a very slight and temporary negative impact on the health of 
the person concerned”71. It is difficult to argue that “low” and “very slight and 
temporary” are synonymous. As already noticed by some commentators, it would also be 
misleading to consider “minimized” risk or burden as equivalent with “minimal”, since 
the minimization of risks is a general requirement for all kind of study on human 
subjects72. Finally, the interpretation in the WHO guidelines for GCP seems to 
categorically exclude the inclusion of subjects incapable of giving personal consent in a 
non-therapeutic study73. 
 
3. The legitimacy and accountability of the ICH activities: the search for 
complementary sources of legitimation  
The proliferation of public-private partnership characterizes the field of global health 
since the 1980s. The WHO has intensively engaged in partnership with the corporate 
sector cooperating in different areas such as development or distribution of drugs and 
vaccines74. ICH stands out with regard to this group of transnational organizations 
because it is the only institution that has been successful at developing global regulations 
applicable to pharmaceuticals. The ICH has been even more successful than the WHO in 
harmonizing approval requirements, although the latter, a UN organization, is the only 
organization that enjoys legitimacy under international law to adopt binding global 
standards for “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health”75.  
As a result the ICH guidelines are today more or less explicitly accepted as including 
the “relevant international standards” for the approval of drugs. This situation is highly 
problematic with regard to the international rules applicable to trade since the TBT 
Agreement encourages national regulators to use international standards as a basis for 
their technical regulations76. National measures conforming to such standards benefit 
from a presumption of consistency with WTO law. The ICH has not been accepted so far 
by WTO members as a specialized organization or body in charge with the formulation 
                                                          
71 The CIOMS guideline Nr. 9 states that the risk should be no more likely and not greater than the 
risk attached to routine medical or psychological examination of such persons. 
72 See R. Andorno, Regulatory Discrepancies Between the Council of Europe and the EU 
Regarding Biomedical Research, in A. den Exter (ed.), Human Rights and Biomedicine, 2010, at. 117 
(126). 
73 § 3.3 points (f) in relation with (g), Guideline for GCP for trials on pharmaceutical products, 
WHO Technical Report Series n° 850, 1995, Annex 3. According to § 3.3 (g): “In a non-therapeutic study, 
i. e. when there is no direct clinical benefit to the subject, consent must always be given by the subject and 
documented by his or her dated signature”. 
74 See the typology established by K. Buse, G. Walt, Global Public-Private Partnerships: Part II, 
Bulletin of the WHO, 2000, at 78. 
75 On the objectives of WHO see art. 1, 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution. On the comparison of 
the relevance of WHO standards as regard to the ICH standards, see: WHO (2001) supra note 57. 
76 See § 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  
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of standards such as for instance the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety77. 
But the de facto relevance of the ICH standards makes this evolution probable rendering 
the question of legitimacy and accountability of the ICH even more acute.   
The efficiency of the ICH’s harmonization efforts alone should not be accepted as 
basis for its legitimacy. The partnership between pharmaceutical industries and public 
authorities creates a need to test the application of the legal standards identified as 
principles applicable to global administrative law (1) and to search for new instruments 
in an effort to develop and reinforce the legitimacy of this particular institution (2). 
a. The extremely limited accountability: actual institutional and procedural 
arrangements 
The global interest in the ICH-activities has provoked the evolution of the institutional 
framework of the ICH, to authorize a greater participation of non-ICH members within 
the process78. Nonetheless these institutional and procedural developments assure only a 
restricted participation to non-participant regions in the decision-making process (1.1). 
The transparency of the harmonization process is also too limited with regard to the 
authority and the nature of the guidelines exposed above (1.2). 
I. Participation 
The governance structure of the ICH is relatively simple. It does not allow the 
participation in the decision-making process of national regulatory authorities, 
departments of health and companies like generic manufacturers from outside the ICH 
regions or other non-state actors representing groups within the civil society 
(professional associations, patient or consumer advocacy group). The governing body is 
the ICH Steering Committee (ICH-SC) that is composed by the six founding members, 
who each have two seats, and by non-voting participants designated by the three 
observers. The steering Committee oversees all activities: first, it determines the 
harmonization activities to be pursued (i.e. initiative for guidelines and other 
instruments). Second, it adopts the guidelines and instruments that have been finalized 
and accepted by the parties through consensus. Third, it supervises the implementation 
and monitoring of ICH commitments. The IFPMA exercises an important role since it 
provides the secretariat and participates, like the three observers, as a non-voting 
member on the ICH-SC.  
The other organs are the new organs created in 1999 and 2008 and the different 
expert working groups. As mentioned above, in 1999 the ICH-SC created the Global 
Cooperation group as a subcommittee, to allow the “participation” of representatives 
from non-ICH regions. In 2008, the ICH-SC also created a structure called the 
Regulators Forum. But these two structures do not offer any participation opportunities 
                                                          
77 See § 3.4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement). On the influence of international standards edicted by this commission in the field of food 
safety, see: R. A. Pereira, Why Would International Administrative Activity be any less Legitimate? A study 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, German Law Journal 9 (2008), at. 1693.   
78 K. Timmermans (supra note 59, at. 655) explains this evolution with reference to the intention of 
the ICH to become a global standard-setter in accordance with WTO law. 
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to their members within the elaboration process of the ICH guidelines. They only 
constitute platforms for discussion, information, and training. Their role is to allow the 
dissemination of ICH standards worldwide. Eventually the Regulators Forum could be 
of some use, since it offers a discussion platform for the sharing of information directly 
between regulatory authorities associated or represented in the GCG.  
The experts’ groups are the informal working groups, the expert working groups 
(EWG) and the implementation working groups. They are composed of official 
representatives nominated by each of the six official ICH members (two representatives 
per party) and of one representative per observer. According to the ICH documents, 
other parties may be invited by the ICH-SC to nominate experts to ICH working groups. 
These parties include ICH Regional Pharmacopeias and the so-called ICH “interested 
parties”, which are those organizations that are expected to implement or to be 
regulated by the outcome of ICH efforts such as the World Self-medication Industry and 
the International Generic Pharmaceutical Alliance or such as “other parties” as 
determined by the steering committee over time. Some drug regulatory authorities from 
non-ICH countries belong also to this group79. Regrettably no more information on when 
and how the participation is to take place are given. The expert working groups are 
created at the different stages of the decision-making procedure by the ICH-SC which is 
a staged, extremely elaborate procedure. Participation of regulatory authorities and 
industry associations in non-ICH regions can also occur at step 3 after the approval by 
the ICH-SC of the draft guideline80. Step 3 is characterized by regulatory consultation 
and discussion. The consultation takes place in the three ICH regions but also beyond 
them. The comments are thus discussed and addressed by the experts group at step 4. 
Since the possibility to formulate comments is not associated with an opportunity to 
discuss the comments with the working group and vote on the result, it is difficult to 
consider this an opportunity for real participation. Moreover, the importance attached to 
science in the standard-setting procedure eventually diminishes the contribution of 
developing countries. In this perspective, the absence of transfer of information and 
publicity of the process within the working groups constitutes an additional obstacle to 
participation.  
II. Transparency 
The ICH website gives access to many documents: e.g. the guidelines and instruments in 
the first and revised forms; the documents called Questions and Answers that give more 
information and explain the implementation of a specific instrument; the reports of the 
ICH-SC and GCG meetings reports; a glossary and other documents explaining the 
elaborate procedure, the institutional structure of the ICH. Public conferences or public 
meetings are also organized, to give an overview of ICH activities as well as an update 
on the instruments and improvements in the implementation in the different regions of 
the world81. 
                                                          
79 The ICH “interested parties” are listed in the ICH glossary.  
80 With this approval, the ICH-SC confirms that there is sufficient scientific consensus on the 
technical issue. The consent of 6 of the 12 voting-members of the ICH-SC is required for approval. 
81 See for example the proceedings of the ICH Japan Symposium 2009. 
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However, decisional transparency will not exist as long as there is no public access 
to internal documents. There is no information on the work and discussions that lead to 
the consensus building at step 2, nor is there information on discussions and work after 
comments have been received at step 3. This lack of transparency is a critical issue for 
various reasons. It first constitutes a real obstacle for the non-ICH members in the 
formulation of comments. Second, it leaves open the question of the potential influence 
of organizations or specialists in ad hoc consultations by the working groups. In fact, for 
the elaboration of the draft guidelines the working groups refer to guidelines that have 
been already adopted on the same questions at the international level by other expert 
groups or organizations. For example, the ICH working groups makes reference in 
several guidelines to the work of the CIOMS82. The ICH could make use of the multitude 
of the sources to reinforce the authority of its instruments. In the same way, the “concept 
papers” that are the documents giving the impulse for the development of a guideline, 
often recommend to include experts from any “interested party” in the EWGs, in 
addition to those from the 6 ICH parties and observers. It would be interesting to 
examine more systematically where and how the “interested party” are implicated in the 
elaboration procedure. 
Finally, the confidentiality of the debates within the EWG is unfortunate since there 
is no ICH code of conduct. No special conditions are imposed for the designation of the 
experts to the different working groups. The ICH-parties are free to designate anyone 
within their “Contact network of experts”. The experts designated by the regulatory 
authorities are subjected to the rules developed in their countries or region. In the 
European Union for instance, it is accepted that the evaluation of scientific evidence in 
the health field requires high scientific quality by the experts, but also integrity and high 
standards of independence. The rules that have to be followed for the designation of 
experts intend to insure that they do not “have any financial or other interests in the 
pharmaceutical industry which could affect their impartiality”83. By contrast, for the 
experts designated by the pharmaceutical industry there are no such rules. This is very 
unfortunate and casts doubt upon the capacity of ICH experts groups to formulate the 
scientific assessments that constitute the basis for the technical harmonization. This is 
even more problematic since the only condition concerning the experts and defined by 
the ICH founding documents is that they should be chosen “to ensure that, in the 
discussions, they reflect the views and policies of the co-sponsor they represent”84. This 
condition should be suppressed and rules for the management of conflicts of interest 
should be developed and applied to all experts.   
b. The search for new forms and procedures improving accountability and 
                                                          
82 This Council had been created under the auspices of the WHO and the UNESCO in 1949. 
Several CIOMS guidelines have influenced the regulatory approach to medicines safety as for instance ICH 
E 2 A (international reporting of adverse drug reactions) and ICH E 2 B (electronic case submission of 
individual case safety reports). 
83 See art. 63 (2) Council regulation (EC) 726/2004 and the EMEA Code of conduct as revised in 
2004 through the guidance on conflict of interests. See also the rules of procedure that apply for the EMA 
scientific committees (www.ema.europa.eu). 
84 See ICH website, Working Groups. 
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legitimacy 
The assessment of the ICH's decision-making procedure under the legal standards of 
Global Administrative Law provides a clear result: the accountability and legitimacy of 
the ICH are extremely tenuous. But one should not forget that the ICH as an 
international public-private partnership creates a new – and very successful – form of 
global administrative decision-making procedure. Some authors have already pleaded 
for the creation of new forms of accountability and legitimation for new “transnational 
administrative networks of agencies”85. These new instruments are diverse, and include 
for instance: the reinforcement of the domestic legitimation and accountability of the 
national agencies participating with the transnational system86; an increased information 
and participation of all constituencies subjected to the exercise of normative authority by 
non-state standard setters87; judicial and non-judicial review mechanisms88. 
Doctrinal analyses are very helpful and cast a new light on some steps already taken 
by the ICH to promote the participation of non-ICH members with the process (2.1) 
and to engage in closer cooperation with the WHO (2.2). 
I. Taking into account new constituencies and their proper needs  
In creating new structures for the participation of non-ICH members within the 
harmonization process, the ICH has proven the flexibility of its particular structure and 
enhanced in some ways its democratic legitimacy. It has underlined the necessity to 
identify and take into account all constituencies in order to reinforce its accountability 
and legitimacy89. The identification of the pertinent actors appears generally to be 
controversial90. The ICH has identified generic and over-the-counter drugs 
manufacturers on one hand, and regional Harmonization Initiatives and some non-ICH 
states represented through their regulatory agencies on the other. Therefore particular 
stakeholders and – in accordance with the internationalist approach – the national states 
as a whole body are now represented91. This move was not self-evident because it 
supposes that the ICH activities concern objectives common to all states. This is the case 
for the ICH because human rights issues are at stake92. In fact, the contemporary content 
of the right to health as a human right authorizes such an interpretation of the ICH 
standards developed originally for the marketing of new medicinal products.  
                                                          
85 See K. H. Ladeur, supra note 23, at 3. 
86 See for example K.-H. Ladeur, ibid., at 25; S. Cassese, supra note 19, at 689.  
87 See for example M. S. Barr, G. P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: the View from Basel, The 
European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), at 24. 
88 See E. de Wet, Holding international Institutions Accountable: the Complementary Role of Non-
Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial review, German Law Journal 9 (2008), at 1987; B. Kingsbury 
et al. (2005), supra note 19, at 39-40. 
89 According to K. Timmermans (supra, note 59, at 655), these efforts are only directed at 
transforming the ICH into an organisation fulfilling the criteria of the TBT Agreement for the definition of 
international standards. 
90 See N. Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, European Journal of International 
Law 17 (2006), 247 (more specifically at. 249). 
91 On the three competing constituency approaches, see Krisch, ibid. at. 253. 
92 On the different approaches of the stakeholders see N. Krisch, ibid. at 249. 
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The right to health has been acknowledged by most countries in the world directly 
in their constitution or indirectly through judicial pronouncement93. Thus, these 
countries comply with regional and international instruments such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR). This right is not 
equivalent to a right to access all kind of medicines and a fortiori it seems difficult to 
invoke the right to health as equivalent to a right to access new drugs. However, it has 
been argued that the right to health is equivalent to a right to access “essential 
medicines”. According to the interpretation of Article 12 of the ICESCR, formulated by 
the UN Committee on economic, social and cultural rights in the General Comment n° 
14 in 2000, state parties have to make sure that “essential medicines” are available in 
sufficient quantities for everyone within their jurisdiction. The concept of “Essential 
medicines” has been introduced at the World Health Assembly in 1975 and refers to the 
drugs defined by the WHO Program on essential drugs that have to be provided as a 
component of “primary health care”94. Analyses have shown that a very small 
percentage of the Medicines on the WHO list of essential medicines are new, patented 
drugs95. In fact a large amount of the drugs retained by WHO are available in generic 
forms. However, rejecting the argument that the ICH standards interfere with individual 
rights on this basis and therefore, that there are no other constituencies than the ICH 
members, would be ignoring two facts: first, the need of developing countries for new 
product as essential medicines to combat infectious diseases is real96; second the 
influence of the ICH activities as set out above. In fact, the ICH standards are today 
applicable to all kinds of medicinal drugs. This is true, first of all, for the ICH-members. 
In Europe for instance, the application of the Common Technical document concerns all 
type of medicinal products97. This is also true for many developing countries: although 
the production of pharmaceuticals in these countries is focused on generics and not on 
new medicinal products, they have decided to comply at least with the most important 
guidelines (quality requirements, analytical procedures and pharmacopoeial 
standards)98.  
                                                          
93 About the judicial recognition of the right to health in Germany, see S. Dagron, Droit à la santé 
et jurisprudence constitutionnelle: les enseignements de l’expérience allemande, in: Mélanges Breillat, Les 
voyages du Droit, 2011, at. 155. 
94 See the Alma Ata Declaration that closed the International Conference on primary health care 
organized by WHO, para. VII (3). “Primary health care” has been defined by the Declaration (para. VI) as 
“essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and 
technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the Community through their full 
participation and at a cost that the community and the country can afford to maintain […]”. 
95 According to D. Matthews (WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: a Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines 
Problem? Journal of International Economic Law 7 (2004), at. 73) fewer than 5 per cent of the drugs 
listed by WHO on the Model List of Essential Medicines are patented. 
96 That point has been acknowledged and underlined by the UN General Assembly in its 
Millennium Declaration. See UN Millennium Declaration, points 19 and 20.  
97 See art. 6 and 10 (1) of the Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to 
Medicinal Products for Human Use, in connection with § 2 of the Annex 1. There is one exception: the 
application for the approval of a generic does not have to respect the form of the CTD in the case where 
the reference product has been authorized under the CTD conditions. 
98 See the viewpoint of an industry representative from a non-ICH country in: Proceedings of the 
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In developing new structures for the participation of the non-ICH members, the 
ICH Steering Committee has reinforced its democratic legitimacy. However this 
enhancement is limited and insufficient as regard to the particular needs of its new 
constituencies. In fact if the realization of the right to access medicines in the concerned 
regions is dependent on the marketing of generics, a stronger participation in the 
decision-making process should in theory improve the democratic legitimacy of the 
Conference. However, in practice, this will probably not improve the fulfillment of the 
proper needs of the non-ICH countries. So far, the adoption of common rules applicable 
worldwide has not been possible because the interests in this field are hardly compatible. 
The argument in favor of a stronger participation of developing countries would rely on 
the unrealistic and empirically unsupported assumption that all stakeholders will have 
the necessary scientific and financial capacity as well as the willingness to advance the 
“global” public interest99. The request formulated by regulatory authorities participating 
with the GCG at the Regulators Forum in 2009 illustrates perfectly the fact that 
scientific and financial capacities are missing. At the Forum, the participants did not 
request voting rights but solely expressed their interest to participate in the EWGs 
discussion which would allow them to better understand the development process of a 
guideline and facilitate its implementation. The focus should be on the concerned rights, 
interests and particularities of the non-ICH members as identified constituencies of the 
ICH.  
II. Reinforcing the “public” part of the public-private partnership 
Public-private partnerships constitute new forms of international governance and it 
might be necessary to develop new standards applicable to them. National 
administrative law has already developed new frameworks in order to authorize the 
public-private collaboration for the delivering of public services and infrastructures. A 
common question attached to the creation of these partnerships always concerns the 
extent to which risks (and responsibilities) can be passed to the private sector. A 
common feature is accordingly the important weight of the public authority within the 
partnership100. 
In the reinforcement of the collaboration with the WHO the ICH has already started 
another (complementary) step, that could constitute an important element favoring the 
legitimation and accountability of international public-private partnership forms of 
administrative activities more generally. The WHO is the only organization that has a 
legal mandate from 193 member states to set global standards for the promotion and 
protection of public health. According to its Constitution, WHO is competent to 
“develop, establish and promote international standards with respect to […] 
pharmaceuticals”101, while the Health Assembly has authority to adopt regulations 
                                                                                                                                                               
8th International conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities, 1996. 
99 See on the capacity to participate of Estonia, L. Rägo, Proceedings of the 8th International 
conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities, 1996. 
100 On the regulation of public-private partnership in the United Kingdom see C. Harlow, R. 
Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2009, at 413. 
101 Art. 2 (u). 
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concerning “standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce”102. WHO has 
already drafted guidelines concerning quality, safety and efficacy of medicinal products 
(also generics and medicinal products for use in self-medication) 103. It has also adopted 
a scientific technical code on the quality of medicinal products called pharmacopoeia 
that takes the needs of developing countries more strongly into account. The 
international pharmacopoeia constitutes a collection of recommended procedures for 
analysis and specifications for the determination of pharmaceutical substances, 
excipients and dosage forms that is intended to serve as a source material for reference 
or adaptation by any WHO member State wishing to establish pharmaceutical 
requirements.  
Cooperation with WHO used to take the form of reference to WHO documents104 
and reports105 as sources for the elaboration of draft guidelines. However, many elements 
have revealed an intensification of the cooperation. For instance, in its decision to 
withdraw the guideline Q 1 F on stability - Data Package for Registration Applications 
in Climatic Zones III and IV (outside the ICH-regions) - in 2006, the ICH-SC has 
acknowledged the divergence between the requirements specified in its guideline and the 
standards for storage conditions retained in the concerned countries. It decided to leave 
the definition of storage conditions in these climatic zones to the respective regions and 
WHO106. Also of note is the reinforced collaboration between ICH and WHO concerning 
the use of the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA) developed by ICH 
to facilitate the coding and the sharing of regulatory information (biopharmaceutical 
development, clinical trials, reporting of adverse events)107. MedDRA is intended for use 
in the pre- but also postmarketing phase of the medicines regulatory process thus 
entering a domain where the WHO has been extremely active. WHO has in fact also 
developed a dictionary meant to serve for coding clinical information in relation to drug 
therapy. The so-called WHO Adverse Reactions Terminology (WHO-ART) serves also as 
a basis for a worldwide applicable coding of adverse reactions. In 2001 WHO experts 
had expressed their concerns about the difficulties for the developing countries connected 
with the use of MedDRA and proposed to involve WHO in the review of the ICH 
dictionary. Since 2007, the MedDRA is fully implemented in the WHO global safety 
database which allows WHO to review data and conduct analyses in both WHO-ART 
and MedDRA.   
4. Conclusion 
                                                          
102 Art. 21 (d). 
103 See for instance the Blue Book edited by WHO in 1999 and 2011 on Marketing Authorization of 
Pharmaceutical Products with Special Reference to Multisource (Generic) Products (Manual for National 
Medicines Regulatory Authorities). 
104 For example WHO GCP. See also supra at note 30 on the influence of CIOMS guidelines on 
pharmacovigilance.   
105 See elaboration of ICH Q 1A and the WHO Report on climatic zones. 
106 See explanatory note in the withdrawal of ICH Q 1 F.  
107 ICH M 1. 
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The ICH has proven to be a very efficient structure for the harmonization of 
requirements for the approval of new drugs. The guidelines and instruments adopted 
exercise a normative influence in many countries within and outside the group of the 
ICH participating regions and constitute real global standards with technical but also 
industrial, political and social implications. Despite the authority of its decisions, the ICH 
does not allow a broad participation in the decision-making process nor provide for the 
transparency of the harmonization procedure. Nevertheless, the recognition of new 
constituencies and their needs reflects a certain flexibility of the structure. There is also a 
broader collaboration with the WHO as sole legitimate organization with a legal 
mandate to set global standards in the field of pharmaceuticals. The ICH should heed 
the special need of its constituencies better and should be more transparent concerning 
the intervention of the WHO. A clarification of the ruling powers of the participating 
national regulatory authorities, in particular for the European Union, could also 
constitute an advantage and represent a supplementary way of strengthening the 
legitimacy and accountability of the ICH.  
 
